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Abstract
This article analyses Spanish Mayors’ perceptions on three areas of possible reforms that are 
currently on the local government agenda: re-scaling, amalgamations and metropolitanization. 
This study shows two main features: On the one hand, a relative homogeneity regarding may-
ors’ perceptions of reforms and, on the other hand, a consistent difference in the mayors’ ori-
entations from two groups of autonomous communities. The first ones acceded to the “fast 
track” decentralization process that unfolded in Spain since 1978, due to the pressure exerted 
by their political leaders; the second group acceded to autonomy in a later wave, equating the 
distribution of power in all the territories of the state.
Specifically, it is found that homogeneity in responses is only apparent when the two groups 
of mayors are considered. Thus, those from “fast track” regions are more in favor of decentral-
ization towards their regions and structures of coordination or cooperation between levels of 
government than mayors in “slow track” autonomous communities. We conclude that, in a 
scenario of shared power and multilevel interdependence, fast-track mayors tend to protect 
more intergovernmental agreements that favor spaces where they can control the formulation 
of policies that affect them.
Keywords: mayors, local government, amalgamation, metropolitan governance, decentralization.
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Resumen
Este artículo analiza la percepción de los alcaldes españoles en tres áreas de posibles reformas 
que actualmente están en la agenda del gobierno local: reordenación, fusiones y creación de 
gobiernos metropolitanos. Este estudio revela dos características principales. Por un lado, una 
homogeneidad relativa de las posiciones de los alcaldes respecto a las reformas y, por otro, 
una diferencia consistente en las orientaciones de los alcaldes de alcaldes de dos grupos de 
comunidades autónomas. Las primeras accedieron al proceso de descentralización por la vía 
rápida que se desplegó en España a partir de 1978, debido a la presión ejercida por sus líderes 
políticos; el segundo grupo accedió a la autonomía en una ola posterior, equiparando la distri-
bución del poder en todos los territorios del Estado.
Específicamente, se ha descubierto que la homogeneidad en las respuestas sólo se aprecia cuando 
se consideran los dos grupos de alcaldes mencionados. Así, los de las regiones de la vía rápida 
están más a favor de la descentralización hacia sus regiones y de estructuras de coordinación o 
cooperación entre niveles de gobierno que los alcaldes en las comunidades autónomas de la vía 
lenta. Concluimos que, en un escenario de poder compartido y de interdependencia multinivel, 
los alcaldes de la vía rápida tienden a proteger más los acuerdos intergubernamentales que favo-
rezcan los espacios donde puedan controlar la formulación de políticas que los afectan.
Palabras clave: alcaldes, gobierno local, fusiones, gobernanza metropolitana, descentralización.
THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE AND THE SPANISH MULTILEVEL 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
Today, Spain is a highly decentralized country. However, the process of devolu-
tion started quite recently, in the early 1980s following the approval of the 1978 
Spanish Constitution. The process of decentralization of the old unitary state was 
mainly driven by territorial pressures, especially coming from Catalans and Basques, 
and to a lesser extent, from Galicians, because this process was not clearly designed in 
the Constitution. Therefore, territorial issues, particularly the functioning and legiti-
mation of the distribution of political powers between the regions and the state has 
been a controversial subject since the beginning of democracy.
In the process of decentralization of Spain, some regional political powers appeared 
as either leaders and laggards. The leaders were the main resistant territories during the 
Francoist regime, namely, those identified with a more democratic resistance and 
which enjoyed some political autonomy under the first Republic (1931 to 1939) 
before the Spanish civil war. Their stronger democratic struggle against Franco served 
to identify peripheral nationalist claims of strong self-government as democratic 
claims that needed to be treated differently in the new Constitution. Therefore, Cata-
lonia, Galicia and especially the Basque Country recovered regional self-government 
with a faster and deeper institutional setting. For other political reasons, Andalusia 
also reached this “fast-track”, even if it has never been very different from the rest of 
Spain in cultural, historical or linguistic terms.
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This foundational division between “fast-” and “slow-track” regions has been 
largely scrutinized at diverse levels and with different approaches. It has been argued 
to have different political effects on citizens’ perceptions and behaviors (León, 2011; 
León and Ferrín, 2007; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2013), electoral issues (Molas 
and Bartomeus, 1998; Pallarés and Keating, 2003; Riera, 2012; 2013) and constitu-
tional regulations or intergovernmental relations (Aja, 2014; Aja and Colino, 2014). 
Specifically from a citizen’s perspective, there is a large amount of research scrutiniz-
ing the impact of the differential territorial distribution of powers in Spain on public 
opinion (for an intensive review, see Liñera, 2014), and the process of state building 
(for classical works, see Linz, 1973; 1985). Regarding citizens’ perceptions, it has been 
demonstrated that the Spanish historical regions have distinctive perceptions on how 
the state needs to be politically organized. On the process of state building, the role of 
culturally different nations has been highlighted.
However, up to the present, no work has paid attention to this divide when con-
sidering mayors’ perceptions of multilevel arrangements and territorial reforms. May-
ors play a crucial role in legitimizing the political system in a country with more than 
8000 municipalities. Therefore, their views and positions over local reforms are of 
undoubted relevance in academic fields. Indeed, mayors are privileged actors inside 
the local councils, with specific agendas and perceptions over territorial reforms poten-
tially affecting them. We assume that mayors are “captured” inside the actual, nested 
multilevel scenario, and therefore, their perceptions of territorial reforms might be in 
some way affected by this fact. Therefore, this work links the institutional design of 
decentralized Spain with the willingness of local government reforms to study their 
relationship.
Therefore, in complex multilevel settings, crossed by organizational and identity 
issues, mayoral perceptions of territorial reforms and options may also be affected (or 
mediated) by these different institutional and identity settings. That is to say, even 
with a high and quite homogeneous level of decentralization at the regional level, 
strong standardized regulation at the local level and regional-centralism, as we will see 
further on, we can still account for differences in perceptions based on this founda-
tional dichotomy between fast-track and slow-track regions.
Thus, taking as a starting point the absence of strong differences among mayors’ 
perceptions due to some institutional isomorphism, our theoretical argument func-
tions as follows: mayors belonging to fast-track regions will be more prone to reforms 
and changes in the multilevel system only when these reforms are designed to preserve 
both strong regional powers and intermunicipal cooperation. The basic assumption is 
that, in a scenario of shared powers and wide multilevel interdependence, mayors in 
fast-track regions will be more likely to shield their main intergovernmental arenas. In 
sum, by preferring stronger regions and intermunicipal cooperation —rather than 
amalgamations or reductions in the power of regions— they are in fact willing to limit 
a wider spread of power across “non-close” tiers. Conversely, mayors in slow-track 
regions are more likely to show more attenuated preferences for reforms empow-
ering regions and intermunicipal cooperation because the perceived importance of the 
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regional level is not as deeply felt as in fast-track regions. Nevertheless, it is worth not-
ing from the very beginning that we draw neither a strong divide nor a fundamental 
split separating Spanish mayors; rather, we aim at scrutinizing the dim but lasting 
effects of a foundational constitutional divide and the effect of some sort of regional 
nationalism in mayors’ perceptions.
We organize our work as follows: after this introduction, we build a theoretical 
part where we briefly describe and explain the multi-layered and complex architecture 
of Spain, followed by a descriptive analysis of the mayors’ responses of regarding the 
three main sources of reforms that have been implemented (or attempted) in Spanish 
local governments: re-scaling, amalgamations and metropolitanisation. In the fourth 
section, we specify our hypotheses and main recodifications. We use data from the 
second round of the Political Leaders in European Cities survey (2015-16), which 
sought to study the role of mayors and the transformation of political representation 
at the local level in several European countries. Afterwards, the fifth section presents 
of the results of the analysis, followed by some general conclusions.
BUILDING AN ASYMMETRIC DECENTRALIZED STATE BEHIND  
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT’S BACK
The political process of decentralization from 1978 to the mid-1980s was far from 
straightforward. Powerful territorial elites’ pressures were in place to determine the 
final structure of the new decentralized state. Today, Spain is formed by seventeen 
Autonomous Communities (ACs) —but none of them is specifically named in the 
Constitution—, fifty provinces (second-tier units of local government) and 8124 
municipalities. In fact, the l process of transition was so tempestuous that, because of 
the need for an agreement between all actors involved, the Constitution finally 
approved only a formal procedure to regionally decentralize the state. A striking fea-
ture of this procedure is the absence of a clear number, scope or concrete competen-
cies of the new regional units that were to be created. Thus, this procedural provision 
in the Constitution led to a process from 1978 to 1985 where most of the actual 
AACC were created, through the Estatutos de Autonomía, in some sort of multiple 
bilateral negotiations between central and territorial elites.
The controversial, and rather nebulous, article two of the Constitution points 
from the beginning and together with the insoluble unity of the state, to a political 
differentiation among “ordinary regions” and “nationalities”: “The Constitution is 
based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible 
country of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the 
nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and the solidarity amongst them 
all”. This foundational dichotomy between a differentiated set of four more powerful 
regions lasted, in juridical terms, up to 1992, where an increase in self-government 
capacities for slow-track (ordinary) regions was generally implemented, formally 
equalizing the system, representing a second wave of decentralization. In fact, the 
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system implemented according to the Constitution has proved to be highly political, 
since no clear constitutional provisions are in place, and the decentralizing dynam-
ics and the intergovernmental game are characterized by a deep political struggle 
(Agranoff and Ramos-Gallarín, 1997; Aja and Colino, 2014; Amat, 2012; Amat et al., 
2009; Arbós et al., 2009; León and Ferrín, 2011). In fact, the intertwined nature of 
governments in Spain, together with their different and overlapping elections, gener-
ate a system in which political bargaining is constant for almost every matter, and 
especially, the territorial structure and competencies of devolution.
The Spanish devolved system underwent a third wave of change, a process led 
again by fast-track regions, which began with the failure to approve a new Statute of 
the Basque Country, and the approval in 2006 of the Catalan Statute. The latter was 
brought before the Constitutional Court, which issued the crucial Sentence 31/2010. 
This limited the federative evolution of Spain, thus frustrating the attempt to increase 
the weight of autonomous powers set out by regions, especially over the regulation of 
local governments (Galán y Gracia, 2011). As a matter of fact, the decentralization 
process was mainly addressed to empower regional units, rather than local ones, which 
were dramatically left outside the debates during the transition and the consequent 
institutional design (Rodríguez, 2011).
Concerning local governments, a completely different path of decentralization 
and institutional design was in place during the transition. The fundamental number 
of units, basic functions and structure remained untouched from the dictatorship 
(and before, coming from the mid-18th century). The whole process of the demo-
cratic transition was made without democratically elected politicians at the local level, 
and the first free elections for the local government were held in 1979, almost half a 
year after the approval of the Constitution. From an institutional perspective, local 
governments were totally left outside the transition and devolution processes, and this 
was translated into the absence of a set of minimal competencies and also the weak-
ness of the basic traits of local structures. Indeed, the basic law regulating local gov-
ernments was not in force until 1985, seven years after democracy was in place1. It is 
true that local political autonomy is constitutionally granted; however, in practical 
terms, it is narrow and conditioned. Moreover, since the approval of the Ley 27/2013, 
de 27 de diciembre, de Racionalización y Sostenibilidad de la Administración Local 
(also known as LRSAL), the question of how local governments must be organized in 
a complex multilevel scenario has put the reorganizational aspects at the top of the 
political agendas.
Therefore, the legal configuration of local governments is quite particular, an 
expression of a fussy multilevel system, where the state dictates the basic regulations 
and the AACC can develop and implement this legal basis. Some authors claim Span-
ish local governments had moved from a “central centralism” under Francoism to a 
1. Year of the approval of the Ley 7/1985, de 2 de abril, Reguladora de las Bases del Régimen 
Local (LBRL).
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“regional centralism”, where municipalities mostly depend on AACC’s decisions and 
regulations (Velasco, 2014; Galán, 2012; 2015). Therefore, to deepen the multilevel 
logic of the system, the developments of the constitutional provisions regarding local 
government are determined at the same time by a central government law and a 
regional law; the Spanish law establishes the basis of the system, while the regional law 
can specify and adapt that central basis with little room for maneuver. In spite of 
political diversity, homogenization is the key concept in local regulations; all munici-
palities that share the same compulsory competencies that are mainly related to the 
provision of basic services (with small variations based on the population), have a sim-
ilar political structure, which only changes with population bands, and the same 
financial limitations and obligations.
When it comes to analyzing local governments and intergovernmental relations, 
scholars tend to look at the relative place and objectives of municipalities embedded 
in the multi-tiered system. For the Spanish case, their intergovernmental relations are 
strongly conditioned by the fact that the budget of each municipality is quite contin-
gent on transferences from both the central and regional levels. Therefore, municipal-
ities are not provided with financial autonomy that is powerful enough to fulfil their 
political autonomy. This complex landscape puts local governments in a difficult posi-
tion, where local elites fight to ensure some independence in a process of consolida-
tion of local levels of government, which has been characterized by the intervention of 
both the central government and regional governments.
In this scenario, some authors argue that the system of intergovernmental relations 
in Spain is much more political than in other federal countries (Agranoff, 2010). In 
this sense, the entire Spanish intergovernmental system is strongly marked by the 
political relations among levels of government and the lack of transparency and 
accountability of those links (Agranoff, 2007). In small and medium towns, local 
elites use their skills and contacts to conduct intergovernmental transactions (Agranoff, 
2010), promoting, at a first sight, regional governments to have a predominant role in 
the whole system.
As a result, Spanish localities are a canonical member of the “Napoleonic” or “Fran-
co-type” form of local government, mainly located in the south of Europe (Heinelt and 
Hlepas, 2006). This group of local government systems is characterised by a high level 
of political autonomy and elite bargaining capabilities, but with low functionality 
—which is to say, low performance in terms of output production (John, 2001; Page 
and Goldsmith, 1987; Wolman and Goldsmith, 1992). This southern group, origi-
nally formed by Spain, France, Greece and Portugal, seems to cling mostly to the idea 
of a strong local representative elite and a centralised bureaucracy. Its members’ notion 
of democracy is more related to creating a sense of identification around the mayor as 
a powerful representative of the local community, rather than any other consideration 
(Haus and Sweeting, 2006; Magre and Bertrana, 2005). The political expression of 
local autonomy, together with the generalised lack of capabilities and resources, is a 
constellation of strong political institutions with narrow margins for real manoeuvres, 
and with a low or very moderate economic impact in aggregate terms.
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MAYORS’ GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF REFORMS IN TROUBLED 
TIMES
It is noteworthy that since 1985 there have been several attempts to reform local 
governments in Spain without much success; but the main reforms addressed by the 
questionnaire have regularly been on the political agenda. The main political and aca-
demic debates concerning the Spanish local government system had turned around 
the constitutional fit of local governments, questions of funding and competences 
and the nature and extent of inter-municipal cooperation. By happenstance, most of 
them were of the utmost relevance at the time when the fieldwork was conducted. We 
will comment on three basic sets of questions. A first group of questions refers to 
re-scaling processes, followed by a piece on amalgamations, which mainly coincide 
with LRSAL reform. The third set refers to processes of metropolitanisation, which 
are also on the Spanish political agenda, but less clearly articulated.
Under the concept of re-scaling reforms, it is usually considered all those measures 
and decisions aiming to change and move political capacities and competences 
between levels of government, including horizontal and vertical movements. Under 
the amalgamation concept, it is usually considered all kinds of mergers and fusions of 
local political units, generally in order to improve their economic performance (gen-
erating economies of scale). Finally, metropolitanization usually includes all kind of 
actions tending to create processes of metropolitan institution building.
The questionnaire devoted up to six questions to mayors’ perceptions concerning 
the more usual reforms on local governments. These questions are designed to be 
answered by mayors regardless their country, and regardless of whether a concrete 
reform is in place or not. The questions address individuals’ perceptions, from which 
we can only extract individual willingness, or the degree of individual agreement for 
each concrete reform. Regarding our data, the survey received responses from mayors 
elected in municipalities larger than 10 000 inhabitants; the original sample size was 
752 mayors (all municipalities beyond that population threshold), and the actual 
responses amounted to 303, which yields a response rate of 40 %. Despite the low 
response rate, the final sample is rather representative of the studied universe both in 
terms of territorial distribution and gender, and therefore, we do not expect the results 
to be biased due to an unbalanced response rate.
Mayors’ perceptions on re-scaling reforms and amalgamations
The re-scaling reforms of LRSAL are framed in the context of an economic crisis 
and under the indications of European and international organizations. Thus, the 
conductive line content was clearly dominated by an overall objective of ensuring the 
financial sustainability at the municipal level. The LRSAL reform has been the widest, 
but still an ineffective, reform of the Spanish local governments’ system (Galán, 2015), 
and an attempt to control local governments’ budgets, with limited effects though 
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(Medir et al., 2017). However, this law attempted to change the foundational law of 
1985 profoundly, with several changes in local autonomy, mainly the following: 
through the reallocation and reduction of local competencies, the re-scaling processes 
among regions, provinces and local governments, and the setting aside of the general 
competence clause2 (Velasco, 2014; Jiménez-Asensio, 2014). In a nutshell, the main 
measures implying re-scaling were the introduction of coordination and oversight 
from provinces, the elimination of non-compulsory services and the transfer of wel-
fare services to the regions (Magre and Pano, 2016), and the economic stimulation of 
voluntary amalgamations.
The LRSAL was backed and designed mainly by the central state, approved 
solely thanks to the absolute majority of the conservative party (PP) in Congress 
from 2011 to 2015. The reception of this bill was far from peaceful from other tiers 
of government. Specifically, regions and municipalities opposed it, since the pro-
posed homogenous regulation challenged not only municipalities’ powers, but 
regions’ self-government on local matters: “The autonomous communities have 
also opposed local reform. They have raised the flag of the defense of the autonomy 
of their local entities, but mainly they were acting against what they considered a 
State invasion of their powers” (Galán, 2015: 12). In this scenario, two main 
adverse reactions to the LRSAL are clearly identified by Galán (2015): several 
appeals to the constitutional court, challenging most of the contents of the law on 
the one hand, and the blocking and reinterpretation of the regional implementa-
tion of the law on the other hand. In fact, the autonomous communities have cho-
sen not to proceed to autonomic development of the precepts of the LRSAL, or to 
do it in a very restricted way, usually driven by the intention to obstruct its appli-
cation regardless of the political party governing the region. As a result, we can 
claim that the bill is still under “non-practical implementation”. Nevertheless, its 
political impact is enormous.
How does this tumultuous situation translate into the mayors’ general percep-
tions? Question 29 asks about how desirable or undesirable were considered five “clas-
sical” reforms affecting local governments: decentralization of tasks to the 
municipalities; decentralization of tasks to the regions; reduction in the number of 
counties; reduction in the number of regions; and creating metropolitan govern-
ments. All of these are answered on a Likert scale from highly undesirable to highly 
desirable. Table 1 shows the raw percentage for every reform in our sample.
First, there is the question of decentralization of tasks to municipalities. As it can 
be reasonably expected, 47,7 % of respondents considers decentralization of tasks to 
municipalities as a desirable reform and 27,6 % a highly desirable reform. However 
and significantly, if we take into account the fact that those are mayors’ responses, 
7,8 % of them considers decentralization to municipalities to be undesirable.
2. The previous art. 28 of LBRL allowed municipalities to act in whatever matter if a ‘local inter-
est’ was at stake.
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On a second issue, mayors were asked to rate the desirability of enhancing decen-
tralization to regions. Here we found a strong pattern, where 73,3 % of respondents 
considers this reform to be a (highly) desirable one, and only 10,6 % considers it 
undesirable. These results seem consistent in the LRSAL context, where regions have 
been the main protective shield of local governments’ autonomy. Congruently, when 
asked about the reduction in the number of regions, only 10,1 % of mayors considers 
this reform as desirable, even if 36,9 % of them do not take side for any option, prob-
ably reflecting the convenience of status quo.
Patterns seem less clear when asking about the reduction of counties and the 
creation of metropolitan governments. With respect to the former, almost 90 % 
of the answers are distributed among the categories highly undesirable (17,3 %), 
undesirable (30,6 %) and neither desirable nor undesirable (40,6 %). Concerning 
the latter, opinions are more divided, with a high percentage (46,4 %) of ambig-
uous answers (neither desirable nor undesirable). The rest of the opinions are 
quite polarized: 5,8 % considers it highly undesirable and 20,4 % undesirable, 
while 23,4 % considers desirable and 4 % highly desirable. These answers are log-
ical for the Spanish case, where there has been no national policy of metropolitan 
reforms. The picture emerging from this first set of questions clearly shows wide 
support for local governments’ decentralization and, especially, to empower 
autonomous communities. These results show that the aforementioned “regional 
centralism” is perceived as a suitable and comfortable intergovernmental arena for 
Spanish mayors.
Table 1.
Percentages of mayors on desirability of re-scaling reforms
Decentralization 
of tasks to 
municipalities
Decentralization 
of tasks to the 
regions
Reduction in 
the number
of counties
Reduction in 
the number
of regions
Creating 
metropolitan 
governments
N % N % N % N % N %
Highly 
undesirable   6   2,1   8   2,8  48  17,3  60  21,5  16   5,8
Undesirable  16   5,7  22   7,8  85  30,6  88  31,5  56  20,4
Neither 
desirable 
nor 
undesirable
 48  17,0  45  16,0 113  40,6 103  36,9 127  46,4
Desirable 135  47,7 123  43,8  17   6,1  18   6,5  64  23,4
Highly 
desirable  78  27,6  83  29,5  15   5,4  10   3,6  11   4,0
Total N 283 100,0 281 100,0 278 100,0 279 100,0 274 100,0
Source: European Mayor 2nd. Round.
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On the same re-scaling debate, in recent years, Europe has found itself immersed 
in a grave economic crisis that has reopened old debates about the strategies available 
to public administrations with regard to the rationalization and economizing of their 
resources in order to reduce public deficit. This has led to different member states 
pushing through policies of austerity and a reduction in expenditures that, in some 
cases, have resulted in a profound transformation of municipal structures. Along these 
lines, in 2010, Greece completed a reorganization of its municipal map that resulted 
in a reduction in the number of municipalities to practically one-third of those that 
had existed up to that time. Some other European countries had also previously 
entered into this debate, one example of which was the redrawing of the Danish 
municipal map in 2008 (Bertrana and Heinelt, 2013).
LRSAL also devoted some room to the promotion of amalgamations, since Spain’s 
municipal map is highly fragmented and unequally distributed in the territory. On 
the one hand, this is based on a few population centers, mainly urban, with a very high 
population density and, on the other hand, on a high number of medium-sized or 
small centres with low population densities, located in inland areas of the country. 
This fragmentation has often been seen as an impediment to taking on, developing 
and providing public services, given that the Spanish Local Government Regulatory 
Law, 7/1985, defines the municipality as an essential body in terms of territorial 
organization, which is provided with its own legal entity and full capacity to exercise 
the public functions that it is charged with. In effect, the application of the law requires 
that the municipality, whether on its own or in collaboration with another entity, 
must provide a series of obligatory services, the extent of which will depend on its size. 
Apart from these generalized, obligatory services, other sectorial laws also attribute a 
number of functions to town or city councils that, in many cases, do not establish any 
limit in terms of population, as the provision thereof is, in principle, obligatory for all 
municipalities.
Concerning amalgamations, the Spanish state has not remained at the margins of 
this European tendency. Indeed, the first drafts of LRSAL provided for the suppres-
sion of all municipalities with populations under 5000 inhabitants, along with their 
absorption into a neighboring municipality should the provision or financial sustain-
ability not comply with the standards of quality stipulated in the text of the law. How-
ever, the final version of the bill in 2013 introduced technical, specific measures aimed 
only at encouraging the voluntary merging of municipalities and introducing a new 
procedure for mergers between neighbouring councils within the same province, by 
way of the so-called “convenio de fusión” —merger agreement— (Calonge, 2015).
In this regard, and to understand the evolution of the bill, it must be taken into 
account that, generally speaking, autonomous communities have an exclusive com-
petence with regard to their municipal structure. Consequently, the policy regarding 
municipal structure (and as a result, municipal mergers) corresponds to each auton-
omous community. The Spanish Constitution, firstly, followed by the Statutes of 
Autonomy allow the different autonomous communities to take responsibility for 
the process of reform and modernization of their territorial organization structures 
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(Calonge, 2015). The central State itself may only partially condition the exercise of 
these regional competences through its power to establish the basic rules of local gov-
ernment (Velasco, 2014: 121).
Notwithstanding the direction taken in recent years by the regulations concerning 
municipal structure in Europe, in Spain, mayors have notably distanced themselves 
from these trends; Spanish mayors were asked to choose between amalgamation and 
inter-municipal cooperation in order to provide improvements to certain aspects associ-
ated with municipal management (question 30). It must also be taken into account that, 
in a context of municipal fragmentation and minifundismo (division into small units), 
the creation of second-level institutions and the use of instruments of cooperation have 
represented a clear alternative to amalgamations. In this case, the goal of the entity is 
centered on a double function: on the one hand, to operate as a support mechanism 
making the presentation of the service possible, above all, for very small municipalities; 
and, on the other, to incorporate economies of scale through an increase in the volume 
of the provision. Definitively, these two mechanisms (amalgamation and cooperation) 
are often considered as possible ways of compensating for municipal fragmentation.
Thus, the mayors were presented with the dichotomy between amalgamation and 
inter- municipal cooperation, based on four axes that, in the end, are those highlighted 
by the academic literature —i.e., the professionalization of public servants, the quality of 
the public service, economic costs and political participation. Table 2 shows their answers.
Table 2.
Percentage of mayors on effectiveness of amalgamations or intermunicipal 
cooperation
Professionalization 
of administrative 
staff
Service 
quality Cost saving
Political 
participation
N % N % N % N %
Intermunicipal 
cooperation is more 
effective
127  45,8 180  65,5 168  60,0  95  34,3
Amalgamation is more 
effective  30  10,8  43  15,6  90  32,1  24   8,7
There is no real utility in 
cooperation or 
amalgamation
120  43,3  52  18,9  22   7,9 158  57,0
Total N 277 100,0 275 100,0 280 100,0 277 100,0
Source: European Mayor 2nd Round.
In each of the cases presented, inter-municipal cooperation turns out to be largely 
the preferred mechanism. The surprising thing, in view of the distribution of the 
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results is, first of all, the unanimity in considering that mergers are not the best instru-
ment for dealing with local government rationalization, distancing the Spanish local 
elite from the regulatory solutions that have been introduced recently and, above all, 
separating them from the analysis of many academics who continue to insist on the 
benefits of amalgamation. It is only recently that studies have appeared that place 
these solutions in any doubt (Magre and Pano, 2012). Moreover, it is only when the 
question is raised regarding economic benefits that the percentage of endorsements for 
municipal amalgamation increases, to the point of reaching a third of those inter-
viewed. While it is true that the main argument that has supported the different 
merger proposals is of an essentially economic aspect (Christoffersen et al., 2007; Bel, 
2012), those in favor of inter-municipal cooperation as a means of achieving a saving 
in costs duplicates those that consider mergers to be the best instrument.
Metropolitan arrangements in Spanish mayors’ perceptions
The 20th century has witnessed the transformation of the European territory: 
nearly three-quarters of the European population currently live in metropolitan and 
urban areas (Eurostat, 2014). The challenges posed by the metropolitan phenomena 
are diverse, including those related to political and institutional issues (like the coor-
dination of policies and services or democratic representation). The debate on how 
metropolitan areas, urban agglomerations and, more recently, city-regions, should be 
governed has become recurrent in the field of urban studies (for a review see Savitch 
and Vogel, 2009; Tomàs, 2012). Most of the literature has focused on showing which 
is the appropriate model of metropolitan governance, ranging from high institution-
alized models to informal arrangements and showing different conceptions of democ-
racy and efficiency at the local and metropolitan scale (Heinelt and Kübler, 2005).
Evidence from diverse comparative studies on models of metropolitan governance 
according to their level of institutionalization shows that metropolitan areas in Europe 
and North America are mostly fragmented political spaces and that powerful metro-
politan governments are exceptional (OECD, 2015; Keil et al., 2016). Indeed, imple-
menting highly institutionalized models of metropolitan governance is complicated 
since the meso- and local levels of governments fear losing their powers or even being 
abolished. Indeed, municipalities are jealous of their competences and funding and 
they don’t want to share them with a metropolitan government. Moreover, in general, 
central governments have difficulties in empowering metropolitan areas by giving 
them special legal status. For instance, in France, the recent creation of Grand Paris 
comes 50 years after the metropolitan councils were created in other cities.
In our survey, some questions are related to the mayors’ role in this system of multi-
level governance and the way they conceive institutional reforms and the models of met-
ropolitan governance. Despite evidence of a metropolitanization process, the Spanish 
political system has not responded to this phenomenon (Alba and Navarro, 2005). The 
central government has not given incentives for the creation of metropolitan areas and 
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this issue has not been important in the political agenda. At a state level, a bill approved 
in 20033 aimed at modernizing the management of councils and the development of cit-
izen participation in large cities, recognizes that these bigger cities share some particular-
ities, but the law does not address metropolitan problems. In 2006, the cities of Madrid 
and Barcelona were given special status as the biggest Spanish cities4. However, in these 
two special laws there are no references to or dispositions regarding the metropolitan 
scale. In sum, governing metropolitan areas is a decentralized competence that, a priori, 
should open the door to the existence of a plurality of models of metropolitan govern-
ance, as in federal states such as Germany (Heinelt and Zimmermann, 2011).
The law regulating local government sets a general framework of local government, 
while it establishes that the regions are responsible for creating, modifying and abolish-
ing metropolitan areas through their own Statutes of Autonomy (article 43 of the law 
regulating local government). In other words, specific legislation on the issue is neces-
sarily regional, while the central government determines general legislation (laws on 
local financial resources, on local government, etc.). This may explain why there is not 
an official statistical definition of “the metropolitan phenomenon” in Spain; it is con-
sidered a regional affair. Unlike countries such as the United States or Canada, there is 
no systematic statistical definition to define metropolitan areas. In fact, the National 
Institute of Statistics does not have a metropolitan category in its classification, and 
there is none provided by most of the regional statistical institutes, either.
Traditionally, AACC have been jealous of their autonomy and have been suspi-
cious of the metropolitan bodies. This was especially true during the 1980s, when the 
corporaciones metropolitanas created during the dictatorship in Barcelona, Valencia, 
Bilbao and Madrid were abolished sooner or later and replaced, in some cases, by sec-
torial agencies. The abolition was decided by the new regional governments and was 
particularly polemic in Barcelona and Valencia. Thirty years later, only in Barcelona is 
there a light version of a metropolitan government, while the rest of urban agglomer-
ations are governed by sectorial agencies or directly by the regional governments (for 
further details on the Spanish models of metropolitan governance, see Tomàs, 2017).
If we compare the different legislation of each autonomous community where the 
main urban agglomerations exist (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Málaga, Sevilla, Bilbao) 
we find one main difference. The statutes of autonomy in three of them recognize the 
possibility of creating metropolitan areas by a regional law (article 93 in Catalonia, arti-
cle 65 in Comunitat Valenciana, article 94 in Andalusia). However, in the statutes 
of autonomy of Madrid and the Basque Country there is no reference to the creation of 
metropolitan areas. These references are to be found on their respective legislation on 
local government: the law of 2003 in the case of Madrid (article 76) and the law of 2016 
in the Basque Country (article 108). To sum up, the degree of institutionalization of 
3. Ley 57/2003, de 16 de diciembre, de Medidas para la Modernización del Gobierno Local.
4. Ley 22/2006, de 4 de julio, de Capitalidad y de Régimen Especial de Madrid and Ley 1/2006, 
de 13 de marzo, por la que se regula el Régimen Especial del Municipio de Barcelona.
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metropolitan governance depends on the regional parliaments, and they have used this 
prerogative scarcely.
Question 32 mainly reveals the importance of the regional level in metropolitan 
affairs, leaving aside the concrete implementation of metropolitan governments (asked 
in question 29). Here, mayors were asked about the effectiveness of several modes of 
governance for the development of their agglomeration. Table 3 shows raw percent-
ages for the whole sample5:
Table 3.
Percentages of mayors on effectiveness of modes of metropolitan governance
Multi-purpose 
governance bodies 
for the urban 
agglomeration
Single-purpose 
authorities / 
special purpose 
districts
 Inter-municipal 
contracts
and cooperation
Support and 
regulations by 
upper-level 
governments
N % N % N % N %
1 Not 
effective at all  12   7,5  27  17,1   3   1,9  10   6,2
2  23  14,3  29  18,4   3   1,9  13   8,0
3  62  38,5  78  49,4  45  27,8  60  37,0
4  58  36,0  21  13,3  67  41,4  61  37,7
5 Highly 
effective   6   3,7   3   1,9  44  27,2  18  11,1
Total N 161 100,0 158 100,0 162 100,0 162 100,0
Source: European Mayor 2nd Round.
The majority of respondents considers the support and regulations by upper-
level governments moderately effective (37,0 %) or quite effective (37,7 %) (values 
3 and 4 out of 5), while 11 % of them considers it highly effective. Again, this is not 
surprising considering that regional governments are responsible for creating or 
abolishing both metropolitan areas and mechanisms for metropolitan cooperation. 
Mayors are more critical when asked about the effectiveness of creating multi-pur-
pose governance bodies for urban agglomerations. Indeed, 7,5 % considers this not 
effective at all, while 14,3 % considers it not very effective; 38,5 % of the answers is 
located in the middle point and 36 % considers it effective. Only 3,7 % considers it 
highly effective. The solution of introducing single-purpose governance bodies (spe-
cial districts) has less support. Indeed, almost half of the respondents (49,4 %) con-
sider it moderately effective (value 3). The rest of the respondents tend to consider 
5. We have to notice here that only those municipalities part of a large urban agglomeration were 
allowed to respond to this question; therefore, our total N for these questions is 184. 
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it not effective at all (17,1 %) and not effective (18,4 %). Only 13,3 % considers it 
effective and 1,9 % really effective.
Finally, mayors were asked about the effectiveness of inter-municipal contracts 
and cooperation, a solution that is very common in smaller urban agglomerations. In 
the last 30 years, the number of inter-municipal associations has grown: from 109 
in 1986 to 996 associations in 2015 (according to the Register of Local Entities from 
the Ministry of Public Administration, 2015: 15). In this case, almost all the answers 
are situated between values 3 and 5, that is, 27,8 % of the respondents considers 
inter-municipal contracts and cooperation as moderately effective, 41,4 % as effective 
and 27,2 % as highly effective. In other words, the option of less institutionalized 
mechanisms of metropolitan governance are well evaluated by mayors.
HYPOTHESIS AND MAIN RECODIFICATIONS
From the previous responses we have already drawn a picture that partly confirms 
some theoretical insights from the position of the municipalities within the Spanish 
multilevel governance system. These partial results seem to confirm a strong —and 
well perceived— regional centralism, a preference for intermunicipal cooperation 
rather than amalgamations for several important aspects, and also a preference for 
cooperative solutions to urban problems. These patterns are general and homogene-
ous, and no significant differences appear when comparing Autonomous Communities.
We know that the fundamental basis of the system is very strong, and does not 
allow for significant institutional differences. However, our theoretical argument con-
siders that the foundational divide between fast-track and slow-track regions may still 
have an influence on mayors’ perceptions. Obviously, the argument is not strictly 
institutional, but rather attitudinal, since we are probably capturing the effect of the 
closeness and relative importance of historical regions in local elites’ minds. In this 
sense, we hypothesize that mayors in fast-track regions will be more prone to keep 
political power between them and the region. In other words, in fast-track regions, 
mayors will be more likely to safeguard their closest intergovernmental arenas, by pre-
ferring stronger regions and intermunicipal cooperation, rather than amalgamations 
or reductions in the power of regions.
This general hypothesis unfolds in several aspects that cannot be straightforwardly 
analyzed and pooled in a single statistical model, given the high number of issues 
involved. Instead, we propose to construct different models for every of the aforemen-
tioned reforms, and to draw a general picture of the difference between fast-track and 
slow-track regions. Therefore, our conclusions will be derived from the interpretation 
of all results taken together.
Our main independent variable will always refer to the division between ordinary 
regions and nationalities, and we always control for different individual and contex-
tual factors, such as gender, age, education, hours devoted to mayoralty, political party 
(recoded), number of political parties in the municipality and population in 2014. 
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Our main independent variable is created by clustering the Andalusian, Basques, Cat-
alans and Galician mayors against the rest of Spain (“Slow-track Regions”, N=155; 
“Fast-track Regions”, N=148). Table 4 offers a description of the rest of the main 
independent variables used:
Table 4.
Independent variables: descriptive statistics
Hours spent each  
week as a mayor Age
Logged population 
2014
Number of 
municipal groups
N 279 277 303 303
Missing 24 26 0 0
Mean 65,738 46,31 10,2066 5,10
Median 60,000 46,00 9,9664 5,00
Mode 60,0 40 9,21a 5
St. Dev 21,7691 8,991 ,86214 1,226
Minimum 12,0 20 9,21 2
Maximum 168,0 73 13,41 9
N %
Gender
Female 65 21,5
Male 238 78,5
N %
Education
Elementary school 4 1,4
Secondary school 41 14,8
University or equivalent 232 83,8
N %
Po
lit
ic
al
 P
ar
ty
 (r
ec
od
ed
)
BNG 3 1,0
C’s 1 ,3
CCa-PNC 9 3,0
CIU 21 6,9
COMPROMIS 12 4,0
 EH BILDU
ERC-AM
8
18
2,6
5,9
IU / ICV 12 4,0
OTROS 25 8,3
PA 3 1,0
PNV-EAJ 12 4,0
PODEMOS Y 
ASIMILADOS 7 2,3
PP 41 13,5
PSOE 131 43,2
Source: European Mayor 2nd Round.
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Our dependent variables are the reforms that were presented in the previous sec-
tion; however, we recode them to capture better the information they provide. We 
show some descriptive data of the recoded dependent variables, reordered by the 
fast-track and slow-track divide. Moreover, in order to deal with all the complexity 
of the questionnaire and its information, we have dichotomized all dependent vari-
ables contained in Q29 and Q32, to better capture the direction of the perceptions, 
in the same restrictive manner. We considered two values (out of five, from the Lik-
ert scales 1-5) as “desirable” and “effective”, clearly stating such options, and recod-
ing the three remaining values as “non-desirable” and “not effective”. Concerning 
amalgamations and intermunicipal cooperation, we dichotomized the variables in 
order to keep in each option (mergers or IMC), those who consider more effective in 
tackling the concerned issue, against those that do not consider it more effective 
than the opposite option, or neither of them. Table 5 shows the data only for the 
“Desirable, “More Effective” and “Effective” options for each respondent belonging 
to the slow-track or fast-track setting:
Table 5.
Descriptive statistics of all dependent variables by type of region
Q29. Rescaling 
processes
Decentraliza-
tion to 
municipalities
Decentrali-
zation to 
regions
Reduction 
of counties
Reduction  
of regions
Creation of 
metropolitan 
governments
Fast-track Regions
Desirable
N 111 123 19 18 47
% 78,2 % 87,2 % 13,8 % 12,9 % 34,1 %
Slow-track Regions
Desirable
N 102 83 13 10 28
% 72,3 % 59,3 % 9,3 % 7,1 % 20,6 %
Q32. Effectiveness of 
modes of governance
Regulations of 
upper-levels
Contracts and 
cooperation
Multipurpose 
governance
Single purposes 
or Special 
Districts
Fast-track Regions
Effective
N 47 67 37 9
% 53,4 % 77,0 % 43,0 % 10,7 %
Slow-track Regions
Effective
N 32 44 27 15
% 43,2 % 58,7 % 36,0 % 20,3 %
…/…
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…/…
Amalgamation (Q30) Administrative staff Service Quality Cost saving
Political 
participation
Fast-track Regions
Is more 
effective
N 18 16 38 12
% 13,1 % 11,8 % 27,3 % 8,8 %
Slow-track Regions
Is more 
effective
N 12 27 52 12
% 8,6 % 19,4 % 36,9 % 8,6 %
Intermunicipal 
cooperation (Q30)
Administrative 
staff Service Quality Cost saving
Political 
participation
Fast-track Regions
Is more 
effective
N 66 103 92 51
% 48,2 % 75,7 % 66,2 % 37,2 %
Slow-track Regions
Is more 
effective
N 61 77 76 44
% 43,6 % 55,4 % 53,9 % 31,4 %
Source: European Mayor 2nd Round.
Finally, to empirically test all these variables in multivariable models, we ran logis-
tic regressions for each variable, with the same independent variables each, to obtain a 
complete picture of Spanish Mayors perceptions’, mediated by the fast-track and 
slow-track division.
THE PERSISTENT AND (STILL) OBSERVABLE EFFECT OF POLITICAL 
AND INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION
Before getting into multivariate analysis, the results displayed in table 5 shows the 
types of reforms where the fast-track and slow-track divide makes a difference. At first 
sight, we can observe some patterns of continuity from the whole sample, but there 
are also some interesting deviances.
In relation to the re-scaling strategies, both types of mayors’ perceptions are 
similar in almost every kind of reform, since all mayors consider the same reforms 
either desirable or undesirable. Both groups are in favor of decentralization for 
municipalities and regions, but substantive differences appear in the regionaliza-
tion reform, where fast-track mayors’ perceptions are stronger (87,2 % versus 
59,3 %), but their positions are similar with regard to municipalities (78,2 % ver-
sus 72,5 %). Both groups also take a homogeneous stance opposing the idea of 
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reducing counties and regions. Again, both groups show minor differences 
regarding the creation of metropolitan governments. Even though it is largely 
non-desirable for both, 34 % of fast-track mayors consider it desirable, while only 
20,6 % of “slow track” ones do it.
As for amalgamations and intermunicipal cooperation, there are no strong differ-
ences for the former. According to the raw numbers in section 3, Spanish mayors are 
widely and strongly against mergers in any form and for any purpose. Concerning 
IMC, a different pattern emerges, since both groups consider intermunicipal cooper-
ation not to be more effective in dealing with administrative issues and increasing cit-
izens’ political participation. However, when it comes to cost savings and service 
quality, the differentiation appears again. Mayors in fast-track regions are more prone 
to consider these reforms as “effective” (75,5 % versus 55,4 % for service quality and 
66,2 % versus 53,9 % for cost savings).
Finally, concerning the effectiveness of the four different governance modes of 
metropolitan municipalities, results show great variation. For instance, regulations 
coming from upper levels of government are the sole exception where perceptions dif-
fer. Mayors in ordinary regions do not consider this governance option as effective 
(43,2 %), whereas mayors in fast-track regions consider this effective to a greater 
extent (53,4 %). Apart from this, mayors in fast-track regions consider the contracts 
and cooperation option to be better (77 % consider them effective, versus 58,7 %) and 
are less opposed to multipurpose bodies (43 % consider them effective, versus 36 %). 
The last option under examination, namely single purpose bodies, is strongly rejected 
by both groups, but with 20,3 % of the slow-track mayors considering them effective, 
and only 10,7 % of fast-track mayors.
The picture emerging from these results accounts for somehow divergent profiles. 
As mayors’ perceptions are substantially equal in all senses, slight differences appear, 
the main ones concerning the strength of the preferences. As we have already indi-
cated, it seems that mayors in fast-track regions are more prone to reinforce regions 
and are less against the creation of metropolitan regions. Moreover and to a larger 
extent, they consider intermunicipal cooperation, as more effective for cost savings 
and service quality. Similarly, they see the reforms based on contracts and cooperation 
much more positively than their counterparts in slow-track regions. Thus, in general 
terms, this picture seems to corroborate the fact that differences in mayors’ percep-
tions can be explained by their belonging to one or another group.
In any case, to what extent are the slight differences we have considered signifi-
cantly different in a multivariate environment? Are those small differences systematic, 
or due to chance? A complete set of logistic regressions is carried out to finally assess 
the robustness of the results we have just shown. In order to increase the reliability of 
our results, we ran the regressions with the same set of independent variables; thus, the 
only variation affects the dependent variable. Indeed, for reasons of space and clarity 
of the interpretations, we offer here only a summary table of our findings. Table 6 
includes only the independent variable that is significant, together with coefficien t β, 
of selected variables.
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The models show interesting results, partially confirming our hypothesis. First, 
even when controlling for seven relevant independent variables accounting for indi-
vidual traits, context and political elements, it appears quite clearly that the most dis-
criminant variable of all those considered is our variable of interest —the divide 
between fast-track and slow-track regions. This independent variable is significant, to 
different degrees, in 7 out of 17 models. Secondly, the direction of the relations 
between it and our dependent variables in every model, when significant, is in line 
with the theoretical expectations and the current political mood. Thirdly, the resulting 
picture configures a slightly identifiable profile of mayors based on their belonging to 
one or another institutional setting.
We built our hypothesis under the assumption of high homogeneity of percep-
tions, but with identifiable specificities derived both from the institutional setting and 
the perceptions of the elites from the devolved Spain. In fact, the picture emerging 
from the analysis of all models shows no significant differences in the willingness to 
reduce the current multi-tier institutional system (reduce regions and counties), and 
also a wide homogeneity in desiring decentralization towards local units, and consid-
ering amalgamations as a bad solution in general terms. Therefore, slight differences 
appear between our two groups of interest.
Figure 1.
Absolute probability to be more prone to empower decentralization to regions
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As expected, the perceptions of mayors from fast-track regions seem to configure 
a homogeneous pattern of protecting their main intergovernmental arenas and insti-
tutional counterparts. These mayors prefer, to a larger and significant extent, decen-
tralization to regions (Q29), placing the autonomous community not only as the 
legal-political center, but also as a confident player in the intertwined game of inter-
governmental relations. This is the strongest effect of all, as figure 1 shows in absolute 
probabilities:
Moreover, the significant and relevant coefficients on considering effective con-
tracts and cooperation (Q32), analyzed together with a consideration of IMC solu-
tions to be more effective with regard to quality of services and cost efficiency, show a 
clear and robust preference for generating intergovernmental spaces where they can 
control —or at least, be aware of— policy-making that affects them.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have assessed mayors’ perceptions of three issues: re-scaling 
reforms, mergers and metropolitan governance. An analysis of the complete sample 
shows a higher homogeneity in responses and relevant continuities, regardless whether 
mayors belong to fast-track or slow-track regions. This homogeneity of local elites’ 
perceptions is not surprising, but it is rather to be expected, since the institutional 
environment of local government units is rather similar across the territory, due to the 
existence of statewide basic laws.
In fact, through the process of decentralization of the state, each autonomous 
community has become the key institution concerning local government manage-
ment. In other words, besides basic regulation coming from the state, autonomous 
communities are the key actors to determine local governments’ day-to-day functioning. 
Our expectations are that this institutional link between local and regional units might 
have an impact on local elites’ perceptions of local government reforms. Therefore, to 
understand these perceptions it is necessary to consider the process of political decen-
tralization that occurred since the end of the 1970s.
The main results show that, generally speaking, Spanish mayors are in favor of 
strengthening decentralization towards municipalities and regions, and therefore, 
similar majorities are against the reduction of counties and regions. Most mayors’ 
positions are less clear when considering the creation of metropolitan governments. 
Moreover, a vast majority of mayors is against mergers and amalgamations, while 
mayors are slightly more favorable to intermunicipal cooperation as a preferred way to 
overcome municipal fragmentation. Finally, the processes of metropolitanization are 
perceived as not particularly adequate for the main local governments’ governance 
challenges.
However, our results show identifiable specificities in mayors’ perceptions derived 
from the institutional setting and the perception of elites from the decentralized 
Spain. Although there are no significant differences in the willingness to reduce 
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regions and municipalities or the desire for more decentralization towards local units, 
slight differences appear between mayors belonging to fast-track regions and slow-
track ones.
Indeed, mayors from fast-track regions are prone to protect their main intergov-
ernmental arenas and institutional counterparts. These mayors advocate for higher 
decentralization to the autonomous community, which emerges as a key actor in the 
intertwined game of intergovernmental relations. To sum up, in this paper we show 
that mayors’ perceptions are influenced by intergovernmental relationships and espe-
cially by the asymmetric process of decentralization that has unfolded over the last 
forty years.
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